
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services



PETITION:

Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an information technology firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. As required by statute, the petition was accompanied by certification from the Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.² For the reasons discussed below, the petitioner has still not established its ability to pay the proffered wage in each year following the priority date. Moreover, while not addressed by the director, the record reveals that the job does not require a member of the professions because education below a baccalaureate is acceptable in the alternative to the primary job requirements.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g., Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

Ability to Pay

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the

The instant petition is for a substituted beneficiary. An I-140 petition for a substituted beneficiary retains the same priority date as the original ETA 750. Memo. from Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Regional Directors, et al., Immigration and Naturalization Service, Substitution of Labor Certification Beneficiaries, at 3, http://ows.doleta.gov/dmstree/fm/fm96/fm 28-96a.pdf (March 7, 1996).

² Subsequent to the appeal, an employer other than the petitioner requested on behalf of the beneficiary that the appeal be withdrawn. The beneficiary, however, is not an affected party. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(a)(3), 103.3(a)(iii)(B). A third party is also not an affected party. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(iii)(B). Thus, we cannot recognize the withdrawal.

priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on December 21, 2004. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$72,439 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the substituted beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner. While the original beneficiary listed on the Form ETA 750A indicated on his Form ETA 750B that he had been working for the petitioner since December 2003, the petitioner has not documented the wages paid to this individual. Moreover, the petitioner indicated on the Form I-140 petition that the position offered is a new position.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have an establishment date in 2000, a gross annual income of \$5,600,000, a net income of \$107,724 and 85 employees. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted its 2005 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on February 26, 2007, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

In response, the petitioner resubmitted its 2005 tax return and submitted its tax returns for 2004 and 2006.

The tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

	2004	2005	2006
Net income Current Assets	(\$107,724) \$37,658 ⁴	\$173,046 ³ \$54,713	\$52,310 \$70,767
Current Liabilities	\$0	\$0	\$ 0
Net current assets	\$37,658	\$54,713	\$70,767

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³ The director concluded that the petitioner's net income in 2005 was \$65,322. That amount, however, includes the petitioner's carry over losses from 2004. As those losses were not incurred in 2005, we will not deduct them from the petitioner's net income in that year.

⁴ This amount included a negative cash balance.

In addition, counsel submitted compiled financial statements for 2005. While these statements contain the same current assets as the 2005 tax return, the net income is listed as only \$165,596.77.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on May 7, 2007, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel notes that the priority date was in December 2004 and asserts that the petitioner's net current assets at the end of 2004 would cover one month of the proffered wage. Counsel further asserts that while the year-end cash in 2005 and 2006 was insufficient, the monthly balances should be considered. Counsel further asserts that the petitioner is now paying the beneficiary above the proffered wage. The petitioner submits bank statements from 2005 and 2006 and a pay statement for the beneficiary dated June 4, 2007.

Where the petitioner has submitted the requisite initial documentation required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during the relevant period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Federal courts have recognized the reliance on federal income tax returns as a valid basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, any argument that the petitioner's total assets should be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include

depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

Counsel requests that USCIS prorate the proffered wage for the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date. We will not, however, consider 12 months of income towards an ability to pay a lesser period of the proffered wage any more than we would consider 24 months of income towards paying the annual proffered wage. While USCIS will prorate the proffered wage if the record contains evidence of net income or payment of the beneficiary's wages specifically covering the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date (and only that period), the petitioner has not submitted such evidence. While bank statements can, on a case-by-case basis, be considered in determining an ability to pay the proffered wage for a single month, the petitioner did not submit any bank statements for December 2004. Significantly, the petitioner's 2004 tax return reflects a negative cash balance.⁶ Even if we were to conclude that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage for the part of December 2004 following the priority date, for the reasons discussed below, the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary prior to June 2007. In 2005, the petitioner shows a sufficient net income to cover the proffered wage. In 2006, however, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$52,310 and net current assets of only \$70,767. The petitioner has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the full proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets.

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation

⁵ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁶ The petitioner's January 2005 bank statement shows an opening balance of \$16,667, but also references other accounts for which the petitioner did not submit statements. Thus, this statement does not necessarily contradict the information on the tax return, which shows an overall negative cash balance.

specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. While the petitioner submitted a series of bank statements, cash used to pay the proffered wage in one month cannot be considered as available to pay the proffered wage in subsequent months. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L considered above in determining the petitioner's net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2004 or subsequently during 2006. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Job Requirements

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part that:

- (2) Aliens who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability. --
 - (A) In general. -- Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an employer in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4) provides the following:

(i) General. Every petition under this classification must be accompanied by an individual labor certification from the Department of Labor, by an application for Schedule A designation (if applicable), or by documentation to establish that the alien qualifies for one of the shortage occupations in the Department of Labor's Labor Market Information Pilot Program. To apply for Schedule A designation or to establish that the alien's occupation is within the Labor Market Information Program, a fully executed uncertified Form ETA-750 in duplicate must accompany the petition. The job offer portion of the individual labor certification, Schedule A application, or Pilot Program application must demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent or an alien of exceptional ability.

(Bold emphasis added.)

USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r. 1986). See also Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the job requires. See generally Madany, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer exactly as it is completed by the prospective employer." Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying the plain language of the [labor certification application form]." Id. at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

The key to determining the job qualifications is found on Form ETA-750 Part A. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Offer of Employment," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA-750 be read as a whole. The instructions for the Form ETA 750A, item 14, provide:

Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties. Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part A of the labor certification reflects the following requirements:

Block 14:

Education: Master's Degree*
Major Field of Study: Computer Science**

Experience: 2 years in the job offered or a related occupation.

Addendum to ETA 750 Part A, Section 14: Minimum Educational and Experience:

*Will accept U.S. Baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree plus five year5s of work experience in a related occupation in lieu of the required Master's Degree, or three years applicable work experience for each year of education lacking.

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(Emphasis added.)

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) defines an advanced degree as follows:

[A]ny United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above that of baccalaureate. A United States baccalaureate degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate degree or a foreign equivalent degree.

Thus, even when considering experience, the minimum education required for classification as an member of the professions holding an advanced degree is a U.S. baccalaureate or a foreign equivalent degree. As the petitioner was willing to accept experience in lieu of a baccalaureate, the job does not require a member of the professions holding an advanced degree.

For the above stated reasons, considered both in sum and as separate grounds for denial, the petition may not be approved. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.